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Abstract: Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion 
in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for 
efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than 
inequity aversion. We show that these results are partly based on a strong subject pool 
effect. The participants of the E&S experiments were undergraduate students of economics 
and business administration who self-selected into their field of study (economics) and 
learned in the first semester that efficiency is  desirable. We show that for non-economists 
the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a non-negligible 
gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps 
surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes. 
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A major puzzle in the literature on social preferences is that a large majority of subjects 
behaves as if completely self-interested in some circumstances, such as in competitive 
experimental markets with standardized goods or in the final rounds of public goods 
experiments, while in other circumstances a large majority behaves as if strongly 
motivated by fairness concerns, e.g., in competitive markets with incomplete contracts or 
in public goods experiments with punishment opportunities. Recently developed models of 
inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) can explain this 
puzzle by assuming a heterogeneous population of selfish and inequity averse subjects. 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004, henceforth E&S) question the relevance of inequity 
aversion in simple dictator game experiments, claiming that a combination of a preference 
for efficiency1 and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than 
inequity aversion.  
In this paper, we show that E&S overstate the relevance of efficiency motives and 
understate the relevance of inequity aversion. The participants of the E&S experiments 
were undergraduate students of economics and business administration. These subjects 
self-selected into their field of study (economics) and learned in the first semester that 
efficiency is desirable. Non-economists, however, may value efficiency much less than 
economists do. We replicated the most relevant E&S experiments with various subject 
pools and are able to show that the dominance of the efficiency motive over the equity 
motive is restricted to students of economics and business administration. Students from 
various other disciplines and a sample of non-academic employees value equality much 
more highly than efficiency.  
This raises the question whether there are other subject characteristics such as gender 
or the political attitudes that affect the preferences for efficiency versus equality. We find a 
non-negligible gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. 
However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to 
political attitudes, i.e., subjects who vote for right wing parties and favor right wing 
political attitudes are as likely to favor equality as are subjects with left wing attitudes. 
  
I. Economists versus Non-Economists  
 
The most interesting results of E&S concern their treatments Ey and P that are designed to 
discriminate between preferences for efficiency, the Rawlsian maximin motive, and 
                                                 
1 “Efficiency” in Engelmann and Strobel (2004) is not defined as Pareto-efficiency but as surplus 
maximization.   
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inequity aversion (see Table 1 below). In both treatments, Person 2 is the decision maker 
(dictator) who can choose between allocations A, B, and C. Note that own choices never 
affect Person 2's payoff. Person 2 can redistribute income from a richer Person 1 to a 
poorer Person 3 in both treatments by choosing allocations B or C instead of allocation A. 
However, choices B and C involve a relatively high efficiency loss. In treatment Ey, every 
additional money unit that is given to the poor person reduces the rich person’s income by 
4 money units, while the rich person suffers an income reduction of 3 units if the poor 
person’s income is increased by one unit in treatment P. In both treatments a choice of the 
efficient allocation A not only constitutes evidence against specific functional form 
assumptions (like piece-wise linearity or positional asymmetry, meaning that subjects 
prefer advantageous inequity to disadvantageous inequity) in the Fehr-Schmidt approach, 
but also against general non-linear versions of inequity aversion.2 Treatment P is 
particularly important because the decision maker (Person 2) always earns the lowest 
income independent of which allocation is implemented. Thus, the decision cannot be 
affected by Rawlsian preferences. Therefore, treatment P constitutes a clean test of the 
relevance of inequity aversion in comparison to the efficiency motive. 
The E&S evidence for treatment P also illustrates an important point regarding the 
interpretation of their results. E&S conclude that “inequality aversion does not seem to be 
a major part in a complete explanation” of their data. This conclusion is based on their 
logit regressions which neglect any individual heterogeneity.3 However, 1/3 of their 
subjects choose the most inefficient and most egalitarian allocation in treatment P 
suggesting that they are motivated by inequality aversion (see Table 1). Perhaps the most 
important message that comes from social preferences models is that in strategic 
interactions the heterogeneity of social preferences is extremely important. As shown in 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) even a minority of inequality averse subjects may have powerful 
effects on the outcome of strategic interactions. Thus, even if it were true that in general 
                                                 
2 The inequity aversion approach by Fehr and Schmidt is compatible with the evidence in several other 
games conducted by E&S (the “envy” games) if one allows for non-linear forms of inequity aversion and 
gives up the assumption of positional asymmetry. 
3 The conditional logit analysis in E&S is problematic for two reasons. First, E&S can only estimate the 
preferences of an “average subject” which neglects any individual heterogeneity. Second, the independent 
variables Eff (which captures the sum of the subjects payoff), Self (which captures the decision maker’s own 
payoff), FSα (which captures the disadvantageous inequality) and FSβ (which captures advantageous 
inequality) are linearly dependent. Thus, they have to exclude one or more of these variables from the 
analysis. The decision which variable one should exclude is, however, completely arbitrary but has strong 
effects on the regression outcomes. If, as E&S do, Self is excluded, FSα and FSβ  are not significant. If, 
however, FSβ is excluded, Self and Eff are not significant. Thus, if one takes their regression approach 
seriously, one could equally well conclude that concerns for efficiency are irrelevant. To make things worse, 
if one arbitrarily excludes Eff  from the analysis Self and FSα suddenly become highly significant. We owe 
this argument to Mathias Erlei who respecified and reestimated the E&S regressions.       
 4
only 1/3 of the population is motivated by inequality aversion, this motive can have 
important effects. However, as we will see below, among noneconomists much more than 
1/3 of the subjects seem to be motivated by inequality aversion.     
 
TABLE 1 – SUBJECT POOL EFFECTS: ECONOMISTS VERSUS NON-ECONOMISTS 
   Treatment Ey Treatment P   
 Allocation A B C A B C 
 Person 1 Payoff 21 17 13 14 11 8 
 Person 2 Payoff 9 9 9 4 4 4 
 Person 3 Payoff 3 4 5 5 6 7 
 Total Payoff 33 30 27 23 21 19 
 Average Payoff  of 1 and 3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5 
 Efficiency prediction A    A    
 Inequity aversion prediction (BO & FS)    C    C 
 Rawlsian maximin prediction    C A or B or C 
 Engelmann & Strobel results 
Economists: Humboldt Univ. Berlin 
      
(A) Choices (absolut) 12 7 11 18 2 10 
 Choices (percent) 40 23.3 36.7 60 6.7 33.3 
 Economists: University of Munich           
(B) Choices (absolut) 72 12 25 63 16 30 
 Choices (percent) 66.1 11 22.9 57.8 14.7 27.5 
 Non-Economists: University of Munich           
(C) Choices (absolut) 22 13 48 21 17 45 
 Choices (percent) 26.5 15.7 57.8 25.3 20.5 54.2 
 Non-Economists: Zurich, Switzerland       
(D) Choices (absolut)    8 8 20 
 Choices (percent)    22.2 22.2 55.6 
 Economists: Zurich, Switzerland           
(E) Choices (absolut) 31 9 18 31 9 18 
 Choices (percent) 53.5 15.5 31 53.5 15.5 31 
 Non-Economists: Zurich, Switzerland       
(F) Choices (absolut) 61 23 78 53 25 84 
 Choices (percent) 37.7 14.2 48.1 32.7 15.4 51.9 
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In a first wave of paid experiment we examined the subject pool hypothesis by 
conducting the Ey and P treatments of E&S with two different subject pools from the 
University of Munich.4 The first subject pool consisted of 109 first year undergraduate 
students in economics and business administration (henceforth called “economists”), while 
the second subject pool was made up of 83 first and second year undergraduates from other 
disciplines, mostly the social sciences (henceforth called “non-economists”). Each subject 
had to make a decision in both of the distribution games discussed above. The results of 
these experiments are reported in Table 1. For convenience, we also show the results from 
the E&S experiments in panel (A) of this table.  
The subject pool effects displayed in Table 1 are striking. The Munich economics 
and business administration students corroborate the main E&S result, confirming that 
preferences for efficiency play a major role among economists (compare panels A and B of 
Table 1). 66.1% of the economists opted for the efficient but most inegalitarian allocation 
A in treatment Ey, even exceeding the 40% in the E&S study. The efficiency advantage of 
allocation A is somewhat lower in game P, and the fraction of economists opting for the 
efficient allocation A decreases slightly to 57.8%, very similar to the E&S results. The 
behavior of non-economists from the University of Munich contrasts sharply with these 
results, however (see panel C of Table 1). In games Ey and P, the non-economists chose 
the inefficient but most egalitarian allocation C at the rate of 57.8% and 54.2%, 
respectively, while only 25-27% opted for the efficient allocation A. The differences 
between the non-economists and the economists from the University of Munich are 
statistically highly significant (p < 0.001 in each treatment, Fisher exact test).  
An additional paid experiment with non-economists (college students) in Zurich, 
Switzerland, who only participated in treatment P, further confirms the robustness of the 
subject pool effect. A comparison of panels C and D of Table 1 shows that these students' 
choices were almost identical to those of the non-economists from the University of 
Munich (p > 0.93, Fisher exact test). Only 22% choose the efficient allocation A, while 
55.6% choose the allocation predicted by inequity aversion. The choices of the non-
economists in Munich and Zurich also differ significantly from the choices of the E&S 
subjects (p < 0.001, Fisher exact test), further supporting a strong subject pool effect. 
                                                 
4 In all experiments reported in this paper, subjects made their decisions anonymously, they were paid in 
private, and there was no role uncertainty, i.e., the decision makers knew that they were in the role of person 
2.  
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II. The Impact of Political Attitudes on Social Preferences 
The strong difference in behavior between economists and non-economists raises the 
question whether there are other subject pool characteristics that might affect the results. 
Subjects’ social preferences could be related to gender, age, or their political attitudes. One 
might conjecture that more right wing subjects are less in favor of equality and prefer more 
efficient allocations than left wing subjects. If this were the case, or if other subject pool 
characteristics had a significant impact, we would have to worry about whether our subject 
pool is reprensentative with respect to these characteristics. To address this concern we 
conducted additional experiments where – after subjects had made their choices in 
treatments Ey and P – we collected information about their political attitudes and how they 
voted in the last general election. We also collected information about their age, gender, 
and their membership in organizations (such as sports clubs or local charities). We 
recruited 58 third semester students of economics or business administration from the 
University of Zurich and 100 third semester students from other faculties (law and 
medicine) and an additional 62 non-economists from outside the university. These last 
subjects were non-management employees of banks and other financial institutions. They 
had no college education, but all of them had completed an apprenticeship for their current 
job.  
The subjects' political preferences were elicited in two ways. First, subjects ranked 
themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates the most extreme left wing position 
and 10 indicates the most extreme right wing position. This self-report measure of political 
attitudes is now widely used in representative surveys in Switzerland. In addition, we 
asked subjects how they voted in the last national election. Both economists and non-
economists participated in these elections at a rate of approximately 70%. For these 
subjects, we computed a Spearman rank correlation between their self-reported political 
attitudes on the 0-10 scale and their votes for left, center, and right parties.5 This 
correlation is 0.78 (p < 0.001), indicating that subjects’ ranking on the left-right scale and 
their actual voting behavior are consistent.  
The results of our new experiments are displayed in panels E and F of Table 1 and in 
Table 2. We first tested for differences between students from non-economic disciplines 
and employees. It turns out that the behavior of these two groups is very similar which is 
                                                 
5 In these calculations, we treat the social democrats and the green party as left-wing parties, the liberal party 
(FDP), the Christian democrats (CVP) and the European people’s party (EVP) are center parties, and the 
Swiss people’s party (SVP) is a right wing party. This classification is also used by political scientists.  
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confirmed by statistical tests (p = 0.775 in the Ey treatment, p = 0.739 in the P treatment, 
Fisher exact test). Therefore, we pooled their data in panel F of Table 1. The table shows 
that both in treatment Ey and P, 53.5% of the economists prefer the efficient allocation A 
whereas only 31% preferred the egalitarian allocation C (see panel E of the table). 
However, this pattern is reversed among the non-economists (panel F of Table 1). A 
majority of non-economists (51.9%) prefers the most egalitarian allocation C and only 
32.7% choose the efficient allocation A in treatment P. Similarly, a relative majority of the 
non-economists (48.1%) prefer allocation C in treatment Ey and only 37.7% choose the 
efficient allocation A.  
The differences between economists and non-economists in self-reported political 
attitudes are small. On average, economists score 5.28 on the left-right scale, whereas the 
non-economists are somewhat more left wing and score 4.95. This difference is statistically 
insignificant (p=0.41, Mann Whitney test). There is, however, strong individual variation 
in both groups. It is therefore interesting to examine whether individual differences in 
political attitude can explain the individual variation in social preferences across subjects.  
In Table 2, we report the marginal effects of ordered probit regressions where the 
choice of the most unequal allocation A is represented with 0, allocation B with 1, and the 
egalitarian allocation C with 2. As explanatory variables, we included a dummy variable 
for economists (1 for economist), a gender dummy (1 for women), the political attitude on 
the left-right scale, age, and a dummy for whether the subject is a member in an 
organization or club. Regression (1) is based on data from the Ey treatment and regression 
(2) uses the data from the P treatment. We pool the data from both treatments in regression 
(3) and control for the potential dependance of subjects’ decisions across treatments by 
clustering on subjects. We also control for a treatment effect in regression (3) by including 
a dummy for the Ey treatment.  
The most important fact stemming from the first three regressions reported in Table 2 
is that the marginal effect for the economists’ dummy is negative and highly significant 
even after controlling for political attitudes. In fact, while political attitude has virtually no 
effect on social preferences, regression (3) shows economists to have an 18 percentage 
point lower probability of choosing the egalitarian allocation C. Age, membership in 
organizations, and the Ey-dummy have no significant effects. The gender variable is 
weakly significant, however, and indicates that women are somewhat more egalitarian. If 
we average over both treatments (i.e. take regression 3), women are roughly 10 percent 
more likely to choose the egalitarian allocation C.  
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TABLE 2 – IMPACT OF SUBJECT POOL, POLITICAL ATTITUDE AND GENDER 
 
Dependent variable: choices in the distribution game 
(0=allocation A, 1=allocation B, 2=allocation C) 
 
New data 
(panel E and F in Table 1) 
All data  
(panels B-F in Table 1) 
 
Independent variables 
(1) 
Ey 
(2) 
P 
(3) 
Ey&P 
(4) 
Ey 
(5) 
P 
(6) 
Ey&P 
Dummy for economist 
(1 = economist) 
 
-0.158**
(0.069) 
-0.198***
(0.069) 
-0.177***
(0.060) 
-0.258***
(0.043) 
-0.242*** 
(0.043) 
-0.246***
(0.038) 
Gender dummy  
(1 = women) 
 
0.066 
(0.066) 
0.125* 
(0.066) 
0.095* 
(0.058) 
0.091* 
(0.048) 
0.086* 
(0.045) 
0.101**
(0.040) 
Political attitude  
(0=left, 10=right) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
   
Age  
 
0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
   
Dummy for membership in
organizations 
0.073 
(0.068) 
0.108 
(0.069) 
0.090 
(0.059) 
   
Dummy for Ey-treatment 
 
  -0.035 
(0.034) 
  -0.037 
(0.025) 
Pr (C) if a non-economist 0.518 0.482 0.500 0.530 0.513 0.518 
Number of observations 216 216 432 443 407 850 
Cluster per Subjects no no yes no no yes 
Prob > chi2 0.0072 0.1035 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0362 0.0211 0.0278 0.0391 0.0468 0.0442 
Note: The table reports the marginal effects of the different variables on choosing the egalitarian 
allocation C. Numbers in parentheses denote the standard error of the marginal effects. The 
marginal effects are evaluated at the point where the dummy for economists is set at zero. The 
estimated baseline probability of choosing allocation C for non-economists is given in the row 
“Pr(C) if being a non-economist”. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically different 
from zero above the 0.1, 0.05 and the 0.01 significance levels, respectively. 
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We pooled all data from our experiments in regressions 4 – 6 to estimate the overall 
impact of the economists’ dummy and a gender dummy on social preferences6. The results 
of these regressions indicate that economists are approximately 25 percentage points less 
likely to choose the egalitarian allocation C, while women are more likely to choose C by 
roughly 10 percentage points. Note also that if we pool the data from both treatments 
(regression 6) the gender dummy is significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
III. Social Preferences in Strategic Contexts 
The E&S experiments all involve dictator games without strategic interaction. This raises 
the question whether concerns for efficiency play a role in strategic games. A large amount 
of evidence suggests that concerns for efficiency are dominated in strategic games. The 
ultimatum game is a striking case in point. Efficiency requires that the responder accepts 
any positive offer. However, the experimental evidence shows that low offers are 
frequently rejected. Similarly, efficiency in linear public good experiments requires that 
players contribute their entire endowments to the public good. While some subjects 
contribute significant amounts in the first rounds of these experiments, the level of 
cooperation frequently declines over time. In the final round, a large majority of subjects 
contributes very little or free rides completely. 
We conjecture that there is a fundamental difference between non-strategic and  
strategic games. We define a strategic game as one where at least two players can affect 
each others' payoffs by their actions and where there are (partial) conflicts of interest. In 
these games players tend to see each other as opponents. In a non-strategic game, however, 
only one player makes a decision that cannot be affected by his opponent. Thus there is no 
rivalry and a more charitable frame of mind may be triggered. To test this hypothesis we 
did a control experiment in which economists participated in an ultimatum game prior to 
playing treatments Ey and P. We conjectured that the ultimatum game might induce the 
subjects to see each other as opponents when they play treatments Ey and P, rendering the 
efficiency motive less important. This is indeed what we observed: the choice of the 
efficient allocation A in game Ey decreased significantly by 25 percentage points and in 
game P by 15 percentage point if the subjects played the ultimatum game beforehand.7 
However, these results have to be confirmed by other experiments using different linkages 
between strategic and non-strategic games in order to better understand what effects are at 
                                                 
6 We took all data reported in panels B – F in Table 1. Since we do not have values for age, political attitude 
and membership in organizations in the experiments reported in panels B – D we cannot use these variables 
in the regressions 4 – 6.  
7 In an earlier version of this paper, Fehr and Schmidt (2003b) we report in more detail on this experiment. 
 10
work and whether it is possible to generalize social preferences from a non-strategic to a 
strategic context. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Our experiments indicate that there is a strong subject pool effect in the simple distribution 
games of Engelmann and Strobel (2004). While a majority of economists prefer efficiency 
over equity, various groups of non-economists, ranging from students of various other 
disciplines to low-level employees of banks and financial institutions, show the opposite 
pattern. On average, more than 50% of the non-economists prefer the most egalitarian (and 
least efficient) distribution, while the probability of an economist choosing this allocation 
is 25 percentage points lower. Thus, we conclude that preferences for equity are of major 
importance in simple distribution experiments, even though there is a significant minority 
of subjects who seem to be concerned about efficiency. We have also shown that subjects' 
political preferences do not affect their social preferences for efficiency and equity. 
Subjects with a right wing political attitude are as likely to choose the egalitarian allocation 
as left wing subjects. Women, however, favor the egalitarian allocation more often than 
men do.   
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